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L Facts
On the night of June 30, 1994, a patron of the Witchduck Inn discov-
ered the bodies of Lam Van Son, the owner of the Inn, Wendell Parish and
Karen Sue Rounds, Inn employees, and Abdelaziz Gren, an Inn patron. All
four victims had been shot once in the head. The cash register was found
open with no money inside.' On July 1, 1994, the police arrested Michael
D. Clagett ("Clagett") for public intoxication, took him into custody, and
read him his Miranda rights.2  Detective Paul C. Yoakum ("Yoakum")
interrogated Clagett regarding the events at the Inn. Clagett initially denied
that he had been at the Inn on the night of the killings. Yoakum mentioned
that Clagett's girlfriend had spoken to the police about him. Additionally,
Yoakum falsely indicated that eyewitnesses had identified Clagett and that
Inn security cameras established his presence at the Inn. Soon after, Clagett
confessed to the killings and explained the details of the crime. Later on
July 1, while still in police custody, Clagett confessed to a television news
reporter?
A grand jury indicted Clagett on four counts of capital murder in the
commission of a robbery.4 Clagett unsuccessfully moved to suppress his
confession to Yoakum.' At trial, the jury convicted Clagett on al counts
and sentenced him to death.6 State and federal courts upheld the capital
murder convictions on direct appeal and in habeas proceedings.7 Appealing
the district court's denial of federal habeas relief, Clagett made the following
arguments to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:
(1) that the trial court erred when it refuse to instruct the jury on his
parole ineligibility; (2) that his confession to police was involuntary; (3) that
1. Clagett v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 263, 266 (Va. 1996).
2. Clagett v. Angelone, 209 F.3d 370, 372 (4th Cir. 2000). The arresting officer
claimed that Clagett had bloodshot eyes, smelled of alcohol, and was having problems with
his balance. Id. at 372-73.
3. Id. at 372-73.
4. Id. at 373; see VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(4) (Michie 2000). Clagett was also charged
with, and convicted of, multiple homicide capital murder. However, that conviction was
reversed on double jeopardy grounds. Clagett, 472 S.E.2d at 272-73.
5. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 373. Clagett argued that the confession should have been
suppressed because there was no probable cause for the public intoxication arrest, Clagett's
request for counsel was denied, deceit was used to overbear Clagett's will, and the public
intoxication arrest was pretextual. Id. a: 373.
6. Id. at 374.
7. Id. at 374; see Cagett, 472 S.E.2d 272-73; Clagett, 209 F.3d at 374.
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he was unable to understand his Miranda warnings because of intoxication
and sleep deprivation; and (4) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
suppress the confession to the police on the grounds expressed in (2) and
I. Holding
The Fourth Circuit rejected Clagett's four claims, denied his applica-
tion for a certificate of appealability, and dismissed his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.9
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Procedural Default
Clagett argued that his confession to Yoakum was involuntary and that
he was incapable of understanding his Miranda warnings at the time they
8. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 374.
9. Id. at 383. The court's consideration of the jury instruction claim, discussed briefly
below, will not be analyzed further in this article.
The Fourth Circuit rejected Clagett's claim that the trial court should have instructed
the jury that he was not eligible for parole. Id. at 377. The court reviewed Clagett's claim
pursuant to the standard mandated by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Id. at 375; see Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending 28
U.S.C. Title 153). The Supreme Court of Virginia had already adjudicated on the merits, and
dismissed, Clagett's claim regarding the jury instruction given to the trial court. Clagett, 209
F.3d at 375. According to AEDPA, federal habeas relief can only be granted if the state
adjudication of the claim either, "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, dearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States," or resulted in a decision that was not based on a reasonable
determination of the facts considering the evidence. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (1996).
Clagett relied on Simmons v. South Carolina to argue that the jury should have been told that
he was parole ineligible. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 375; see Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S.
154, 171 (1994) (finding that a jury is entitled to hear of parole ineligibility when future
dangerousness of defendant is at issue). However, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that
Clagett did not establish his parole ineligibility. Clagett, 472 S.E.2d at 272. The Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court that the finding of the Supreme Court of Virginia was
not unreasonable. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 376. According to Virginia's three-strikes provision,
felony offenses that are "part of a common act, transaction or scheme" are not counted
individually for purposes of parole eligibility under section 53.1-15 I(B 1) of the Virginia Code.
Id. at 376; see VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-151(B1) (Michie 1998). The Fourth Circuit ruled that
the acts at the Inn dearly constituted a "common act, transaction or scheme." Clagett, 209
F.3d at 376; see Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 506, 510 (Va. 1995) (stating that a
series of murders committed in different places over a time of several hours constituted a
common act, transaction or scheme for purposes of three-strikes analysis); Ramdass v.
Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 404-07 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted in part, 120 S. Ct. 784 (2000)
(concerning three-strikes analysis when a guilty verdict had been returned but judgment had
not been entered). For more detailed facts of Ramdass, see Ashley Flynn, Case Note, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 179 (1999) (analyzing Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1999)). For a
discussion of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ramdass, on certiorari, see
Melissa A. Ray, Case Note, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 111 (2000) (analyzing Ramdass v. Angelone, 120
S. Ct. 2113 (2000)). Clagett was not parole ineligible, and made no argument that he was in
any way "technically eligible but functionally ineligible" for parole. CLagett, 209 F.3d at 377.
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were given to him."0 The Fourth Circuit determined that Clagett had
procedurally defaulted these claims." The federal courts may treat claims
that were not exhausted in the state court but that would be barred in state
court at the time the petition for federal habeas relief was sought as proce-
durally defaulted.' 2 Clagett did not exhaust the involuntariness and un-
knowing waiver claims in state court." Clagett did not exhaust the claims
because he objected in his federal habeas petition to his confession's admissi-
bility based on different grounds than those argued during trial, on direct
appeal, and in state habeas proceedings. 4 Clagett argued in the state courts
that the confession was inadmissible, claiming that his arrest lacked proba-
ble cause, that his request for counsel during interrogation was denied, that
his will was overcome by police misrepresentations, and that the arrest was
pretextual." In his federal habeas petition, Clagett argued that the confes-
sion was inadmissible because it was involuntary and because he had been
unable to understand his Miranda warnings.' 6 At the time of the federal
habeas petition, the claims challenging the admissibility of Clagett's confes-
sion would have been barred in state court under three independent state
procedural rules."7
10. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 377-78.
11. Id. at 378-83.
12. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991) (finding that federal courts
generally cannot review a state court dismissal, for procedural default, of a federal constitu-
tional claim).
13. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 378.
14. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (reading in relevant part: "nor shall any person be
... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness aginst himself"); 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)
(1996) (requiring exhaustion of claim in state court before petitioner can make the claim in
federal habeas proceedings).
15. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 373.
16. Id. at 374.
17. Id. at 379. In Virginia, claims not argued at trial cannot be argued on direct appeal.
Coppola v. Warden, 282 S.E.2d 10, 11 (Va. 1981) (dismissing appeal of denial of writ of habeas
corpus because trial counsel did not make an objection at trial to intent instruction, despite
the fact that such instructions had not been determined to be unconstitutional at the time of
trial). Claims that were not argued on direct appeal cannot be raised in state habeas proceed-
ings when the petitioner does not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the state
habeas petition. See Walker v. Mitchell, 299 S.E.2d 698, 699 (Va. 1983) (restricting ineffective
assistance of counsel claims to habeas proceedings); Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682
(Va. 1974) (rejecting petitioner's right to argue at habeas proceeding that the process by which
he was identified in court was impermissibly suggestive). However, Clagett could not have
made an ineffective assistance of counsel argument because claims that are not raised in the
initial state habeas petition generally cannot be raised in later state habeas proceedings. See
VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-654(B)(2) (Michie 2000) (stating that "[n]o writ shall be granted on
the basis of any allegation of facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any
previous petition"). Therefore, Clagett's claims would have been procedurally defaulted by
the Virginia courts, and consequently, could not be considered by federal courts either.
Clagett, 209 F.3d at 378.
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B. Use of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel to Argue
Procedurally Defaulted Claims
While procedural default on state grounds would normally preclude
federal habeas review of a state prisoner's claims, a petitioner may argue
defaulted claims after demonstrating cause for the default and actual preju-
dice. 8 Cause for procedural default can be demonstrated by showing that
the petitioner did not receive effective assistance of counsel. 9 In this way,
arguing ineffective assistance of counsel can serve as a "gateway" to federal
haheas review of a procedurally defaulted claim.20 Assistance ocounsel that
is at or above the constitutionally acceptable level cannot provide sufficient
cause to excuse the procedural default.2
Strickland v. Wasbington" established the standard for determining
which ineffective assistance of counsel claims excuse procedural default.'
The test required Clagett to show that defense counsel's conduct did not
meet an objective standard of reasonableness and that actual prejudice
resulted.24 Clagett's claim that his counsel's performance constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel would have required the conclusion that
counsel's pursuit of the pretextual arrest argument was not objectively
reasonable.2" However, the district court believed, and the Fourth Circuit
agreed, that the pretextual arrest theory possibly could have precluded
amssion of the confession to Yoakum and of the later confession to the
reporter, if the latter had been considered "fruit of the poisonous tree."26
However, if Clagett had chosen to argue on the bases asserted in his federal
habeas proceeding, the later confession may have been admissible regardless
18. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). The court in Clagett also noted
that another exception to procedural default is allowed when a fundamental miscarriage of
justice would be the result. However, Clagett did not make such an argument and the court
denied the existence of any miscarriage of justice. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 379 n.5.
19. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (finding that evidence of counsel's
inadvertent error in raising a substantive claim is not sufficient to show cause for a procedural
default).
20. The court noted that Clagett argued the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
as a free standing ground for habeas relief rather than as a means for justifying his procedural
default of the new grounds for objecting to the admissibility of the confession. The court,
however, also analyzed the assistance of counsel argument in its "gateway" function to cure
the procedural default. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 379. The court later dismissed the free standing
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 382; see infra note 41.
21. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
22. 466 U.s. 668 (1984).
23. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (finding that a successful
ineffective assistance of counsel daim ies a showing by the defendant that counsel's
performance was deficient and that prejudce resulted).
24. Id. at 687-88, 693-94.




of the decision precluding the initial confession.27 The court added that
other facts of the case substantiated defense counsel's decision to pursue the
pretextual arrest theory, induding the following: (1) the arresting officer
knew police were searching for Clagett in connection with the murders; (2)
the call regarding Clagett was an "assist-rescue" rather than a "suspicious-
person" call; (3) the police found Clagett sleeping, not unconscious; (4) the
police testified to Clagett's responsiveness; (5) the police never considered
the possibility that Clagett resided at the apartment outside of which he was
found; (6) the condition in which Clagett was found was as consistent with
sleep deprivation as intoxication; and(7) the police never charged Clagettwit public intoxication.28 Additiony, counsel must be allowed signifi-
cant latitude in determining strategy. The Fourth Circuit concluded,
therefore, that counsel's pursuit of t e theories that Clagett's arrest lacked
probable cause, that Clagett's request for counsel during interrogation was
denied, that Clagett's will was overcome by police misrepresentations, and
that the arrest was pretextual, did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness."
The court rejected Clagett's argument that defense counsel could have
argued both the pretextual arrest theory and the theory that the confession
was involuntary. Arguing the pretextual arrest required counsel to deny
that the defendant was intoxicated, whereas intoxication was a prerequisite
for the claim that the confession was involuntary or that the Miranda
warnings were ineffective."
Clagett's argument that the involuntary confession, unknowing waiver
claims were as likely to preclude admission of the second confession as the
pretextual arrest theory, was also rejected. 2 The best strategy available need
not be employed for counsel's performance to be objectively reasonable."
The court proceeded to explain, however, that Clagett's argument would
fail even ira more stringent standard were required of counsel.' If the
arrest had been found to be pretextual, Clagett would have been able to
argue that the second confession to the reporter was "fruit of the poisonous
tree."35 Arguing that the constitutional violations involved with the first
confession so "tainted" the second confession would have been more diffi-
cult under the involuntary confession, unknowing waiver claims.3 Pursuit
of the involuntary confession, unknowing waiver claims would have re-
27. Id. at 380-81.
28. Id.
29. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
30. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 380-81.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 381-82.
33. Id. at 381.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 380.
36. Id. at 381.
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quired Clagett to make a connection between the first confession to the
police and the second confession to the reporter because, under the new
theory, the police were lawfully holding Cagett at the time of the second
confession.' The court concluded that while a confession following an
involuntary confession is subject to "taint" analysis,38 the petitioner failed
to offer anything indicating that any alleged "taint" on the first confession
had not dissipated at the time of the later confession. 9  Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit concurred with the finding of the district court that even if
the original confession had been suppressed, the later confession to the
reporter was its "substantive equal."' Counsel's strategy at trial met the
objectively reasonable standard necessary to overcome an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim.4 1 As a result, the procedurally defaulted state court
claims could not be argued in federal habeas proceedings.42
IV. Implicationsfor Virginia Capital Practice
The implications of this case for general Virginia capital practice are
two-fold. On appeals to Virginia state courts, the defense generally cannot
substitute the grounds upon which a claim is based for new grounds.43
Therefore, the defense must choose carefully the grounds upon which a
claim is based. This is of added concern when, as in the current case, the
respective grounds are conflicting and cannot be argued in the alternative.'
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has demonstrated that a petitioner can
argue defaulted claims at federal habeas proceedings if the petitioner shows
that the ineffective assistance of counsel caused the procedural default, and
that actual prejudice ensued.4" However, it is necessary to remember that
the court does not need to consider a free standing ineffective assistance of
counsel claim as a basis for habeas relief. The claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel should be stated as cause to excuse the procedural default.' The
court's interpretation of counsel's performance allows great deference to the
strategy utilized.47
37. Id.
38. SeeOregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,307 (1985) (determining that aMiranda violation
will not automatically "taint" a later confession from the suspect).
39. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 382.
40. Id. at 380, 382.
41. Id. at 382. The ineffective assistance claim was considered in regards to procedural
default. As a result, the court's conclusion on the merits required it to reject Clagett's
independent ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id.
42. Id.
43. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
44. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 381.
45. Id. at 379; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
46. Clagett, 209 F.3d at 379; see supra note 20 and accompanying text.




On the night of July 6, 2000, Michael Clagett was executed in the
electric chair at the Greensville Correctional Center in Virginia.4" The
United States Supreme Court rejected Clagett's final appeal. Before his
death, Clagett apologized to the families of the victims killed at the Inn.
Reactions from the victims' family members who were present varied.
After Clagett was declared dead, one commented that he was not angry
anymore. Another family member said, "It doesn't bring any one of them
back." 50
James Ryan White
48. The Week in Review, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July 9,2000, at C4.
49. Id.
50. Chris Grier, Tim McGlone, & Cindy Clayton, In Prison, Clagett Married Cousin
Widow Says She 'Can 't Explain" Why She Loved Executed Killer, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT AND
THE LEDGER-STAR, July 8, 2000, at B1.
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